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COMMENT
THE IMPORTANCE OF SECTION 1981
Theodore Eisenbergt
& Stewart Schwabtt
Section 1981,1 an important but obscure Reconstruction stat-
ute, is suddenly at the cutting edge of civil rights doctrine. On April
25, 1988, the Supreme Court ordered reargument in Patterson v. Mc-
Lean Credit Union2 to reconsider Runyon v. McCrary,3 a twelve-year-
old case applying section 1981 to private conduct. In Runyon, black
children sued a segregated private school, claiming that the refusal
to admit blacks denied them the "same right . . . to make and en-
force contracts.., as is enjoyed by white citizens," as guaranteed by
section 1981. 4 The Supreme Court agreed, holding that section
1981 prohibits private persons, as well as the government, from ra-
cially discriminating in contractual relations.
In Patterson the section 1981 claim is for employment discrimi-
nation. Brenda Patterson, a black bank teller, claimed that her su-
pervisor harassed her because of her race.5 Although title VII of the
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
tt Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. The data used in this Comment
were gathered with financial support from the National Science Foundation, Grant no.
SES-8510284.
1 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). Section 1981 stems from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. It was reenacted in part by § 16 of the Enforcement Act of
1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, and in full by § 18 of the same act. The rights protected by
§ 1 of the 1866 Act and by § 16 of the 1870 Act became §§ 1977-1978 of the Revised
Statutes. 18 Stat. 347 (1875). Section 1981's statutory ancestor in the 1866 Act was a
prime weapon in Congress's fight against the Black Codes enacted by Southern states
after the Civil War to keep in check the newly freed slaves. Like the other Reconstruc-
tion civil rights statutes, § 1981 and its predecessors lay largely dormant for nearly a
century. In 1968 the Court revived a closely related provision. See infra note 24.
2 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988).
3 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
4 Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
5 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1144 (4th Cir. 1986), cert.
granted, 108 S. Ct. 65 (1987), reargument ordered, 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988).
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Civil Rights Act of 19646 prohibits employers from racially harass-
ing employees, 7 it requires the plaintiff to follow an elaborate proce-
dure before filing suit.8 Apparently Patterson filed too late to bring
a title VII claim,9 so instead brought her racial harassment claim
under section 1981. The Fourth Circuit, following prior authority,
recognized that section 1981 supports a claim against private em-
ployers of racially discriminatory hiring, firing, or promotion be-
cause those acts "go to the very existence and nature of the
employment contract."' 0 Nevertheless, the court of appeals refused
to hold that racial harassment, standing alone, abridges the section
1981 right to "make" and "enforce" contracts."1 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to review this refusal.' 2 After oral argu-
ment, the Court ordered reargument on the broader question of
whether Runyon itself should be reconsidered, that is, whether sec-
tion 1981 applies to private parties at all.'
3
In deciding whether to overturn Runyon, the Court will attempt
to divine the intent of the Reconstruction Congresses. Some schol-
ars believe the enacting Congresses never intended section 1981 to
cover private discrimination. 14 Even if the Court agrees, that would
not end the issue, for it must also decide whether to overturn Run-
yon. The principle of stare decisis suggests that the Court should
not overturn a statutory decision simply because it thinks the earlier
Court holding was wrong. After all, if Congress disagrees with Run-
yon, it can pass a new statute limiting section 1981 to government
conduct.' 5 Congress has shown no inclination to do so.
The question posed by the reargument in Patterson, then, in-
volves conflicting considerations. How wrong (if at all) was Runyon,
and how disruptive would it be for the Court to overrule it? The
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
7 E.g., Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977); cf. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986) (sexual harassment claim).
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982).
9 805 F.2d at 1144 n.* ("Presumably for statute of limitations reasons, Patterson
did not assert a claim under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... .
10 Id. at 1145.
11 Id. at 1145-46.
12 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 65 (1987).
13 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1987).
14 Criticism was of the prior decision allowing § 1982 to reach private behavior. C.
FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88, pt. 1, 6 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT 1248-57 (1971); Casper, Jones v. Mayer, Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968
SuP. CT. REv. 89. But see Levinson, Book Review, 26 STAN. L. REv. 461, 482-83 (1974)
(arguing for more generous reading of 1866 Act).
15 For an example of congressional control of the Court's statutory interpretations,
see Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 56 U.S.L.W. 45 (1988),
overturning Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (narrowly construing civil
rights statute).
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Justices dissenting from the order to reargue Patterson warn that the
Court should be reluctant to overturn Runyon and other cases apply-
ing section 1981 to private discrimination because they have be-
come "an important part of the fabric of our law." 1 6
This Comment neither examines the intent of the Reconstruc-
tion Congresses nor assesses the strength of the stare decisis argu-
ment. It instead examines the quantitative importance of section
1981 litigation in the "fabric of our law." As part of a larger empiri-
cal study of civil rights cases,' 7 we have examined the courthouse
record in every section 1981 case filed in fiscal 1980-81 in the Cen-
tral District of California, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and
the Northern District of Georgia. Together, these three districts ac-
counted for 7.9% of all nonprisoner civil rights claims filed in fiscal
1980-81,1 s and they include the major cities of Los Angeles, Phila-
delphia, and Atlanta.' 9 Based on these data, we describe the
number and type of claims brought under section 1981, and how
these claims relate to claims brought under other civil rights
statutes.
To our knowledge, this is the only existing data set on filed sec-
tion 1981 cases. 20 Actual operation of section 1981 is relevant both
to assessing how embedded in the fabric of our laws the section has
become and to any legislative initiatives that may precede or follow
the Patterson decision on the merits.
We first examine the nature and number of section 1981 cases
and compare their quantity and characteristics to cases under other
civil rights statutes. Because much of the debate about section 1981
stems from its overlap with title VII, we then examine the extent of
that overlap.
I
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LITIGATION UNDER
SECTION 1981
Before the Court reassesses its prior interpretation of section
16 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 190 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
17 Our initial findings from the study, largely on § 1983 cases from the Central
District of California, are reported in Eisenberg & Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional
Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641 (1987) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Schwab, Reality].
The study's methodology is explained id. at 652-58. We expand our study of § 1983
cases in Schwab & Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the
Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. - (forthcoming
1988) [hereinafter Schwab & Eisenberg, Explaining].
18 Schwab & Eisenberg, Explaining, supra note 17.
19 On the representativeness of the case sample, see id.
20 The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, which keeps data on federal court
cases, does not have a separate category for § 1981 cases, only for the broader catego-
ries of "Civil Rights-Jobs" and "Other Civil Rights." See Eisenberg & Schwab, Reality,
supra note 17 at 660-61, 668-69.
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1981, it is helpful to know what role section 1981 actions play in the
federal civil rights program. Table I lists the number of non-
prisoner cases filed that invoked each of several federal civil rights
statutes in a one-year period in the three districts. It shows, not
surprisingly, that the two dominant federal civil rights statutes are
title VII, relied on in 433 cases, and section 1983,21 relied on in 506
cases. The Table also shows that, based on the number of filed
cases invoking it, section 1981 is the third most important federal
civil rights statute. Its invocation in 252 cases places it well behind
section 1983 and title VII, but well ahead of all other federal civil
rights statutes. Crude extrapolation from the three districts to a na-
tional figure yields an estimate of 3,190 section 1981 claims filed in
one year.2 2 If, as some believe, a flood of section 1983 cases threat-
ens our courts and cities, 23 then civil rights litigation under section
1981, roughly half as great as litigation under section 1983, is also a
major legal phenomenon.2 4
TABLE I
NUMBER OF CASES FILED UNDER CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES THREE
DISTRICTS, 1980-8125
42 U.S.C. § 1981 252
42 U.S.C. § 1982 39
42 U.S.C. § 1983 506
42 U.S.C. § 1985 or 1986 171
Title VII (employment) (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17) 433
Title VIII (housing) (42 U.S.C. § 3604) 15
Title VI (federally assisted programs) (42 U.S.C. § 2000d) 10
Title IX (sex discrimination in education) (20 U.S.C. § 1681) 2
Title II (public accommodations) (42 U.S.C. § 2000a) 1
Equal Pay Act (29 U.S.C. § 206(d)) 27
Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 791) 17
Age Discrimination Act (42 U.S.C. § 6101) 1
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 U.S.C. § 621) 43
21 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
22 Arrived at by treating 252 filings under § 1981 as 7.97o of the number of na-
tional filings. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
23 Eisenberg & Schwab, Reality, supra note 17, at 644-52.
24 There is a noteworthy relationship between § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982),
the other surviving remnant of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Court's decision
in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), interpreted § 1982 to reach a
private racially discriminatory refusal to sell a house. It thus opened the way for inter-
pretation of section 1981 in Runyon. According to Table I, filings under § 1981 dwarf
those under § 1982. This is because § 1982 establishes rights only with respect to inher-
iting, purchasing, leasing, selling, holding, and conveying property. Section 1981
reaches contracts without the limitation to property. Indeed, our data show that 21 of
the 39 § 1982 cases also have a § 1981 count.
25 More than one statute may be relied on in a case.
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Examining the outcome and procedural progress of section
1981 litigation reveals no distinctive pattern differentiating it from
litigation under section 1983 and title VII. Table II compares the
important characteristics of cases filed under the major civil rights
statutes. Section 1981 plaintiffs are successful 26 about as often as
other civil rights plaintiffs. 27 Moreover, the burden of section 1981
litigation as measured by discovery and trial activity is similar to the
other two provisions. For example, Table II shows that section
1981 cases generated interrogatories in 46.5% of cases, while sec-
tion 1983 cases produced interrogatories in 39.1% of the cases.
Rates of trial are slightly higher in section 1981 cases but the rate at
which court records reflect money settlements is lower than for the
other two categories.
TABLE II
CHARACTERISTICS OF CASES FILED UNDER MAJOR CIVIL RIGHTS
STATUTES, 1980-81, THREE DISTRICTS
§ 1985
Case Characteristics § 1981 § 1982 § 1983 or 1986 Title VII
Success 46.1% 55.3% 51.3% 46.7% 50.2%
Answer 83.0% 84.2% 73.9% 76.4% 80.5%
Interrogatories 46.5% 34.2% 39.1% 47.3% 42.6%
Hearing 36.9% 26.3% 37.7% 33.3% 32.1%
Pretrial conference 40.2% 31.6% 32.1% 38.8% 36.2%
Depositions 57.3% 44.7% 43.7% 55.2% 50.2%
Trial commenced 23.2% 15.8% 15.9% 18.2% 20.0%
Production of documents 29.5% 23.7% 23.0% 32.7% 24.8%
Money judgment 2.5% 2.6% 2.7% 1.2% 2.6%
TOTAL CASES 241 38 483 165 420
Our data also reveal the type of claims being brought under
section 1981. On its face section 1981 reaches discrimination in all
contractual relations, 28 and published decisions recount a wide vari-
ety of claims.29 Overall, however, employment cases dominate. Ta-
26 To account for plaintiffs' successes not reflected in court records, we adopt a
broad, somewhat artificial measure of success. A case is successful if (1) the plaintiff
wins after trial or on a motion for summary judgment; (2) the parties settle; (3) the court
grants a stipulated dismissal; or (4) the plaintiff dismisses the case voluntarily. The
broadness of the measure should not greatly distort the comparisons of success rates
between groups of cases. For a discussion of the definition of success and problems in
measuring it, see Eisenberg & Schwab, Reality, supra note 17, at 676-77, 681-83.
27 In Table II, we screen out transferred and pending cases, as well as cases sus-
pended for statistical purposes. Its totals therefore differ from Table I's totals. The
success rates for all categories are well below those for non-civil-rights litigation. Id. at
674, 677-83; Schwab & Eisenberg, Explaining, supra note 17.
28 See supra note 4.
29 E.g., Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1975) (dealings with
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ble III breaks down the types of cases filed under section 1981 in the
three districts. Employment claims comprise 77% of all filings
under the statute. The only other cases with substantial filings in-
volve "police misconduct," which arise not from the contracts
clause but the equal benefit and like punishment clauses of section
1981.30 The dominance of employment claims suggests examining
the relationship between section 1981 and title VII.
TABLE III
TYPES OF § 1981 CASES FILED, 1980-81, THREE DISTRICTS
Kind of § 1981 Case No. Percent
Employment 195 77.4
Police misconduct 29 11.5
Housing or zoning 9 3.6
Job related speech 3 1.2
Other 9 3.6
Schools 2 .8




RELATIONSHIP TO TITLE VII
There is some feeling that an employment race discrimination
claim under section 1981 is less compelling than other section 1981
claims because title VII, a comprehensive statute specifically
designed by Congress to remedy workplace discrimination, may
supply an alternate remedy. For example, Brenda Patterson could
have brought her case under title VII, had she met the procedural
prerequisites3 1 Justice Blackmun, dissenting from the order to
reargue Patterson, conceded somewhat defensively that "it is proba-
bly true that most racial discrimination in the employment context
will continue to be redressable under other statutes. '3 2 Justice Ste-
vens likewise noted the substantial overlap between section 1981
and title VII in workplace discrimination claims.33 BothJustices em-
mortuaries); Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974) (recre-
ation facilities); Sims v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 343 F. Supp. 112 (D.
Mass. 1972) (sale of insurance); United States v. Medical Soc'y, 298 F. Supp. 145 (D.S.C.
1969) (admission to hospital).
30 For a case relying on the "equal benefits" and "like punishments" clauses of
§ 1981 as a remedy for police misconduct, see Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 904 (1978).
31 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
32 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419, 1422 (1988) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
33 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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phasized the importance of section 1981 claims outside of
employment.
34
One might question this feeling that title VII renders section
1981 largely superfluous in employment cases. The Court itself has
held, in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,35 that the remedies
under title VII and section 1981 are "separate, distinct, and in-
dependent." 36 Not only do title VII and section 1981 differ in sub-
stance 37 and procedure, 38 but there are important differences in the
scope of coverage. 39 Title VII only applies to employers with 15 or
more employees, 40 whereas section 1981 has no minimum size re-
quirement. 4 1 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission es-
timates that this size limitation excludes about 10.7 million workers
(14.4% of the workforce) and 86.3 percent of all establishments
from title VII's coverage. 42
Our data reveal considerable but not complete overlap between
34 Id. at 1422-23.
35 421 U.S. 454 (1974).
36 Id. at 461.
37 The Fourth Circuit holding in Patterson that § 1981, unlike title VII, does not
support a claim of racial harassment is one difference, should that holding stand. Fur-
ther, all plaintiffs in § 1981 cases must prove intentional discrimination, whereas title
VII covers discrimination with a disparate impact alone. Compare General Building Con-
tractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982) (section 1981 requires proof of dis-
criminatory intent) with Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (recognizing
disparate impact claim under title VII).
38 As Professor Player remarks, "Enforcement of Title VII involves a complicated
set of state and federal pre-suit administrative steps that... [are] a labyrinth with many
traps." M. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw, § 5.71, at 470 (1988). Section
1981 has no administrative agency to process claims. Section 1981 plaintiffs, unlike title
VII plaintiffs, can obtain punitive damages. Bibbs v. Jim Lynch Cadillac, Inc., 653 F.2d
316, 318 (8th Cir. 1981) (punitive damages under § 1981); Miller v. Texas State Bd. of
Barber Examiners, 615 F.2d 650, 654 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980) (no
punitive damages under title VII). Jury trials are available for § 1981 claims but not title
VII claims. Ward v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 823 F.2d 907, 908 (5th Cir. 1987).
39 See generally Comment, Developments in the Law-Section 1981, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 29, 105-09 (1980).
40 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982).
41 Section 1981 may not apply to minor and personal private employment relation-
ships such as babysitters and live-in caretakers. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 669 n.l1 (2d ed. 1983). Other employers subject to § 1981
but exempt from title VII may include bona fide private membership clubs, see id. at
1007, and the uniformed military services, see Taylor v.Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1200 (8th
Cir. 1981).
42 These are unpublished estimates made by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), applicable for the "early 1980s." Telephone interview by Bruce
Kennedy, Public Services Librarian, Cornell Law School, ofJohn Allmaier, Mathematical
Statistician, EEOC (June 3, 1988). Published census data report "establishments" and
subdivide establishments into those with fewer than 10 employees and those with 10 to
19 employees. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY BUSINESS
PATTERNS 1984, at 3 (1986). Taking half of the number of employees and establish-
ments in the 10-19 category and adding them to the number of employees and establish-
ments in the fewer-than-10 category suggests that some 16 million workers (227o of the
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title VII and section 1981. In 1980-81 in the three districts, plain-
tiffs filed 321 complaints of racial discrimination in employment.
Two hundred seventy (84%) filed a title VII claim.43 Of the title VII
claims, almost one-half (133) also had a section 1981 claim.
More intriguing are the 41 cases brought under section 1981
and not under title VII.4 4 Eleven of these cases were brought against
government defendants and also relied on section 1983. These
cases would not be affected by a reversal of Runyon. The 30 remain-
ing cases would be affected by a Runyon reversal, however, particu-
larly if they could not also be brought under title VII. We have no
way of knowing whether plaintiffs in these cases were not covered by
title VII or were simply avoiding title VII. If the former, reversal of
Runyon would destroy almost 9 percent (30/321) of all racial em-
ployment discrimination claims. This is ,more claims than are
brought under most civil rights statutes.45
CONCLUSION
Has section 1981 become an important part,"of the fabric of
American law? We think it has. If our data reflect the national ex-
perience, section 1981 is the third most frequently relied on civil
rights statute. Even ignoring section 1981 cases with an overlap-
ping title VII claim, section 1981 remains one of the most important
civil rights statutes. In the employment area, it furnishes a remedy
to the large class of workers not covered by title VII. We find that 9
percent of all race discrimination employment complaints have a
section 1981 claim without a title VII or section 1983 count. Over
14 percent of the workforce and 86 percent of all employers are
covered by section 1981 but not title VII.
A statute's impact cannot be measured solely by the cases filed
under it. Its influence on primary behavior and its symbolic value
also count. Although plaintiffs file relatively few nonemployment
cases under section 1981 against private defendants, 46 it does reach
beyond the employment sphere to important matters such as in-
workforce) work in establishments with fewer than 15 employees (82% of all
establishments).
43 This differs from the 420 title VII cases in Table II because many title VII cases
are not race cases.
44 Ten race discrimination employment cases relied on neither statute.
45 See supra Table I. Of cases that rely on both title VII and § 1981, we do not know
the number of cases in which, due to procedural or substantive limitations, plaintiffs
erroneously relied on title VII. Treating such spurious title VII claims as bona fide over-
states the overlap between the two employment discrimination provisions.
46 Our data revealed six § 1981 private nonemployment race cases filed in 1980-81
in the three districts.
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dependent contracting 47 and private school segregation. Section
1981, as interpreted in Runyon, makes it more difficult to run a seg-
regation academy or any other segregated activity. Section 1981 has
become an important symbol supporting the generalization that ra-
cial discrimination in this country is unlawful. Reinterpretation of
section 1981 would open huge gaps in the federal antidiscrimina-
tion legislative program, presenting the specter of "whites only"
signs for a broad range of activities.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to fault an institution for admitting
its mistakes and seeking to correct them. In the field of race rela-
tions, the Supreme Court bears a particularly heavy responsibility to
do so. For as surely as it helped launch the modem race relations
revolution with Brown v. Board of Education,48 it contributed to our
racially polarized society with its early restrictive interpretations of
post-Civil War constitutional amendments and legislation. 49 If the
Court, sua sponte, reviews its interpretations of Reconstruction era
statutory and constitutional enactments, one hopes that it will re-
think controversial decisions unfavorable to civil rights litigants as
well as favorable ones such as Runyon.
47 Cf Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1980) (title VII
does not reach independent contractors).
48 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
49 SeeJames v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903) (invalidating portions of 1870 Act);
Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887) (invalidating part of 1871 Act); Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating Civil Rights Act of 1875); United States v. Harris,
106 U.S. 629 (1883) (invalidating part of 1871 Act); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542 (1876) (narrowly construing Enforcement Act of 1870); United States v. Reese, 92
U.S. 214 (1876) (invalidating portion of 1870 Act); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36 (1873) (narrowly construing privileges or immunities clause); Blyew v. United
States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1872) (narrowly construing Civil Rights Act of 1866).
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